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Abstract The role that investor conduct plays in applying the fair and equi-
table treatment standard is relatively unexplored. On the basis of conceptual
analysis, and emerging international judicial and arbitral case law, this arti-
cle suggests that investor conduct is an important consideration. Investor
duties are being accepted in relation to the avoidance of unconscionable
conduct, the reasonable assessment of investment risk in the host country,
and a duty to operate an investment reasonably. These requirements may be
said to lead to a new limit upon the fair and equitable treatment standard
encapsulated in the phrase Caveat Investor.
The fair and equitable treatment standard is a cornerstone of the evolving
international law on the protection of investors and their investments. It has
attracted significant attention not only in doctrinal writing but also in recent
arbitral jurisprudence under the auspices of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). To date, the standard has been discussed
primarily as a measure for determining the obligations of host countries
towards investors and investments.1 In this process the role, if any, that the
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conduct of the investor may play in the evolution and application of the stan-
dard has not been examined in much detail. Such an examination may be
necessary in view of the fact that the application of the standard is beginning
to cover a wider range of governmental administrative action and judicial or
other national dispute settlement processes.2 This, in turn, may raise demands,
on the part of host governments, to constrain the application of the standard
through the development of new defences, so as to ensure a proper balance
between the protection of investors and the inherent right of a State to regulate
economic conduct within its borders.
The need for such defences may be of especial concern for developing
country governments, whose limited resources can affect their ability to
provide an effective evaluation of the nature of the proposed investment, and,
subsequently, to ensure that the expected benefits are realized. Equally, tran-
sitional country governments, that have limited experience of dealing with
private investors in a market-based system, may find themselves confronted
with investor actions that may weaken the value of their investment to the
economy and community. As will be shown in this paper, such concerns have
not gone unheeded before international investment tribunals.
It has been argued that the balance between host country and investor
concerns can be achieved by reference to international minimum standards of
treatment as an integral part of the fair and equitable treatment standard.3 This
will no doubt help in determining what the host country must not do to ensure
that investors are treated fairly and equitably, but it may well miss the point.
Administrative action is a highly complex, and virtually indispensable, part of
modern governance. It is usually concerned with very specific contexts and
policy goals. Key to administrative effectiveness are perceptions of what
investors are doing and whether their acts benefit the economy and the wider
public interest. Therefore a central question in any defence to a claim of unfair
and/or inequitable treatment on the part of the investor must be: what was the
investor doing to engage the allegedly unfair administrative response?4 It is
the purpose of this paper to explore further the implications of including
considerations of investor conduct in the determination of whether an act of
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the host countrys administrative and/or judicial authorities has breached the
fair and equitable treatment principle. It will approach this task in two steps.
First, it will address the main conceptual issues that the inclusion of investor
conduct as an aspect of the standard might raise. This will begin with a review
of the methodology behind the evolution of the fair and equitable treatment
standard, bearing in mind that it is a standard based on international law and
must therefore develop on the basis of how international legal rules develop.
Secondly, the paper will review the main international judicial and arbitral
sources that might assist in showing how far, if at all, investor conduct already
plays a part in deciding the scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
In this connection, the development of the fair and equitable treatment stan-
dard has been a major aspect of the recent surge in case-law concerning
investor-state disputes. However, the express discussion of investor conduct
has been relatively sparse in that context. On the other hand, investor conduct
issues have been more regularly addressed in relation to claims of regulatory
taking. There seems no reason against using the pronouncements of tribunals
on these matters as an aid to the elucidation of how investor conduct issues
might develop in relation to the fair and equitable treatment standard. Indeed,
just as the various claims made by an investor can and do overlap, given their
origin in one set of facts, so too will the investors conduct be of relevance to
an assessment of all claims they make. Although these determinations by
tribunals are far from providing a developed doctrine of the role of investor
conduct in the resolution of investment disputes, they are highly suggestive as
to the importance that should be placed on such conduct in appropriate cases
and as to the kinds of investor conduct that will be relevant.
In addition to recent arbitral awards, note must be taken of the two cases
decided before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that are of direct rele-
vance to the present discussion. These are the Barcelona Traction Case,5 in
which the ICJ made certain pronouncements concerning the role of equitable
analysis in relation to investor claims against host countries, and, more impor-
tantly, the ELSI Case6 where the conduct of investors lay at the heart of the
decision that the 1948 USItaly Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, and its 1951 Supplementary Treaty, had not been breached by the
Italian authorities when dealing with the events arising out of the bankruptcy
of the US owned and controlled Italian company Elettronica Sicula SpA
(ELSI).
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Case did not seek to apply the fair and equitable treatment standard to the facts as the FCN Treaty
did not contain any explicit reference to that standard. However, the emphasis placed on corpo-
rate conduct in that case is instructive to the present discussion as it helps to shed light on how
such conduct might be used in determining whether the investor can rely on the protection of the
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Given the evolving character of the fair and equitable treatment standard,
the discussion that follows maps the beginning of a process that may lead to
the crystallization of a formal doctrine by which the host country can provide
evidence of investor conduct in defence of its regulatory actions. From the
ensuing analysis, it appears that investor conduct will be relevant at all stages
of the case: in determining whether the fair and equitable standard has been
breached, in determining the causal relationship between the conduct, the
impugned act and the alleged harm suffered, and in determining the amount of
compensation to be awarded. At the substantive level, certain trends can be
discerned in the case-law that point to the need for an investor to take care in
how they act if they are to benefit from the full protection and security of their
investment under an IIA. These may be classified around three major duties:
a duty to refrain from unconscionable conduct, a duty to engage in the invest-
ment in the light of an adequate knowledge of its risks, and a duty to conduct
business in a reasonable manner. Where unconscionable conduct is found, this
may have serious consequences for any claim made by the investor. Evidence
of such conduct may vitiate any right to a claim, especially if the regulatory
response that is being challenged arises out of the application, by the host
country, of its powers to punish the conduct through an interference with the
investment. On the other hand, given that the second and third duties may be
said to lie in a general duty of care in the conduct of foreign investment busi-
ness, rather than in a strong moral abhorrence of certain types of conduct, the
consequences of a failure to comply may be less serious. Here evidence of fail-
ure to comply may result in a reduction of compensation commensurate with
the causal connection between the investors conduct and the degree of loss
that can be attributed to that conduct, rather than to any alleged abuse of regu-
latory powers on the part of the host country. Taken together this emerging
case-law does suggest that investor conduct is important and may lead to the
development of a new limit to the fair and equitable treatment standard that
can be encapsulated in the phrase: Caveat Investor!
I. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
The fair and equitable treatment standard is still shrouded with considerable
uncertainty, although certain elements appear to be taking clearer shape. Thus,
it is now reasonably well settled that the standard requires a particular
approach to governance on the part of the host country that is encapsulated in
the obligations to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and in total
transparency, without arbitrariness and in accordance with the principle of
good faith.7 In addition, investors can expect due process in the handling of
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their claims8 and to have the host authorities act in a manner that is non-
discriminatory and proportionate to the policy aims involved.9 These will
include the need to observe the goal of creating favourable investment condi-
tions and the observance of the legitimate commercial expectations of the
investor.10 On the other hand, the standard is case specific and requires a flex-
ible approach given that, it offers a general point of departure in formulating
an argument that the foreign investor has not been well treated by reason of
discriminatory or other unfair measures that have been taken against its inter-
ests.11 Such case specific flexibility cannot ignore the possible relevance of
investor conduct in a given case. In addition, certain further arguments can be
put in favour of allowing investor conduct to form a consideration in the fair
and equitable treatment standard. Both on a literal interpretation of the terms
fair and equitable, and on a contextual interpretation, there appear to be no
obstacles to such an extension of reasoning.12
A. Literal Interpretation of Fair and Equitable
The concepts of fair and equitable are, to a large extent, interchangeable.
Fair is defined, by the Concise Oxford Dictionary, as just, unbiased, equi-
table, in accordance with rules.13 Thus fairness connotes, among other things,
equity. It leaves open the possibility of looking not only at the conduct of the
person who must act fairly but also the conduct of the person who is acted
upon. Indeed, that would be the implication of the synonymous use of equity
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in this connection. For if equity means anything it suggests a balancing
process and weighing up of what is right in all the circumstances. It is, after
all, a word related to the idea of equilibrium defined as a state of physical
balance.14 In addition equity is itself defined not only as synonymous with
fairness but also as the application of the principles of justice to correct or
supplement the law.15 Thus the dictionary definition refers explicitly to a
legal usage. Accordingly the meaning of this usage should now be briefly
considered.
In English law, equitable principles developed to ensure that the unjust
effects arising out of a literal and inflexible application of the common law to
a case could be avoided.16 The application of equity by the Chancery was
based on a willingness to review the specific facts of a case to determine
whether, in that context, the application of a principle of law was proper or
whether it had to be replaced by an assessment of what would be right and just
on those facts. Thus equity, in a legal sense, connotes a degree of flexibility
arising out of sensitivity to the need to apply rules with discretion. This mean-
ing of equity is accepted as an aspect of international law.17 Furthermore, the
development of equitable principles in English law has led to the development
of certain maxims of equity which have crystallized into guiding principles
for the application of rules of law.18 Certain of these clearly take into account
the motives and behaviour of any person who seeks equitable relief. Thus it is
said that the person who comes to equity must do equity and that the person
who comes to equity must come with clean hands. The conduct of the
claimant is central to the application of equitable principles. Indeed, such equi-
table considerations are also echoed in the logic of common law principles
concerning commercial fairness. While generally espousing the doctrine of
freedom of contract, English commercial law will expect that, in return for
legal protection, a commitment to fair and honest conduct on the part of the
claimant, as well as on the part of the defendant, can be demanded.19 This can
be summarized in the concept of unconscionability, where the court will set
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aside any contract that is tainted by an element of improper conduct on the part
of the claimant or defendant that the law recognizes as unconscionable.20
B. Contextual and Teleological Interpretation
A purely literal approach to the interpretation of legal terms is often very
incomplete. The term(s) in question must be reviewed in the light of the
context and policy behind their use. In this connection, it should be recalled
that the fair and equitable treatment standard, as a part of the wider interna-
tional minimum standard of treatment for aliens, has been described as an
evolving one that is not frozen in time and that it is in a constant process of
development.21 Accordingly, the meaning of the standard should be deter-
mined in the context of the value system that underlies the international invest-
ment protection treaties in which these terms can be found.
The need for ensuring a good investment climate has already been
mentioned as one issue that will inform the content of the standard. It moti-
vates an investor protection perspective. In addition, it will be necessary to
consider the needs of the host country that is charged with the duty to regulate
the entry and behaviour of aliens into its territory in the public interest.22 This
duty is based on the inherent international legal right of the sovereign State to
regulate conduct that occurs upon its territory. That right pre-exists any limi-
tation thereon created by international agreement. Accordingly this will moti-
vate a restrictive interpretation of the terms in question, as they constitute a
qualification of a general principle of international law. The need to balance
these two perspectives is essential if international investment agreements
(IIAs) are to operate effectively and with a degree of political legitimacy. Too
much investor protection will create an impression that national sovereignty
has been given up to control by faceless international tribunals, whose deci-
sions may restrict the regulatory powers of host countries, while too much
discretion for the host country will raise fears of bad governance, and a result-
ing poor investment climate, on the part of investors. Neither outcome is
intended by the terms of IIAs.
To take this point further, as Thomas Franck suggests, fairness in relation
to international investment must be seen in the context of the way in which the
global capital market operates. According to Franck,
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the [global] capital market operates within a political system. That system,
whether national or international, speaks to what its participants perceive to be
key developmental priorities, cultural values and the distribution of social goods.
The political system thus constitutes a special case of justice as fairness
discourse within the larger quest for legitimate rules and institutions to promote
development.23
He sees the development of developing countries as a core element in this
process, one that may see the law insisting on a degree of state intervention
in the terms of capitalization, production and earnings.24 In this connection,
it may be said that the fairness of such regulatory conduct towards investors
cannot be judged without also assessing the conduct of investors towards the
community on behalf of which the State may act. This introduces a number of
further contextual considerations as possible sources of interpretation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard: first the relationship between investment
risk and the legitimate expectations of investors and, secondly, the possible
influence of rising expectations of international corporate social responsibil-
ity.
As to the question of investment risk, given the international character of
foreign investment it may be said to carry a higher degree of risk than purely
domestic investment. Indeed, foreign investment may be characterized as a
prime example of high risk-high return investment. Even large multinational
enterprises can experience a high level of risk on a host country that is unfa-
miliar to the firm. Such risk is exacerbated where the country in question is
noted for political instability, corruption, and an inefficient system of admin-
istration. In such cases it may be especially important for the investor to be
able to rely on international standards of treatment, and international systems
of dispute settlement, to ensure the full security of its investment. On the other
hand, in a market economy, a degree of independent judgment as to the scope
of an investment risk will be expected of the investor. Not all investment risks
can, or should, be protected against. This may prove inimical to the efficient
functioning of a market economy, where the freedom of economic actors to
make informed business judgments lies at the heart of the market mechanism.
It is up to the firm to determine the risks and to develop an appropriate strat-
egy to deal with them.25 Any assessment of regulatory fairness will need to be
made in the light of this factor. Thus losses caused by bad management of
investment risk should not, in principle, be compensable under the fair and
equitable treatment standard. This may be related to the legitimate expecta-
tions element of the standard, in that it cannot be a part of the investors legit-
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imate expectations that they should be able to avoid losses caused by poor
management, by blaming them instead on poor regulation by the host coun-
try.26
As to the rise in expectations that investors should be good corporate citi-
zens and respect the emergent principles of international corporate social
responsibility, it may be said that these represent a benchmark by which the
conduct of multinational enterprises will increasingly be judged in the future.
Such standards have emerged in international codes of conduct, notable
among which are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises27 and
the UN Global Compact,28 and in corporate and industry codes, as well as
binding conventions.29 These standards can serve to inform the content of
what may be regarded as ethical business practice. They include, in particular,
a general duty to obey the law, to pay taxes, to act in accordance with funda-
mental labour standards and to observe human rights principles. Firms should
also avoid involvement in bribery and other forms of corruption, provide full
disclosure of their activities as required by national law, and act in accordance
with general standards of market fairness as required under law. Thus firms
should not act in an anti-competitive manner by engaging in restrictive busi-
ness practices or abuse of a dominant position, or take unfair advantage of
weaker competitors, such as through international transfer pricing manipula-
tions that are not open to domestic firms. In addition, firms should facilitate
development objectives through assisting in technology transfer and in observ-
ing national development policies. 30 These standards could be used to assess
the conduct of a foreign investor in a given case. Failure to meet these mini-
mum ethical standards could act as a factor in determining whether the
investors complaint of unfair and inequitable treatment is properly made out.
That is not to say that, whenever the investor falls below these standards of
behaviour, the host country authorities are entitled to act in any manner they
like. In all cases they must act in accordance with the good governance stan-
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dards that are inherent in the fair and equitable treatment standard. However,
it may allow a tribunal to assess more accurately whether the regulatory action
in question was proportionate and whether the nature of the investors conduct
entitled the regulator to interfere with the investors rights. It would shift the
onus onto the investor to show that their behaviour did not warrant the regu-
latory response that they encountered. Finally, it should be stressed that
recourse to international standards of corporate social responsibility will not
preclude the imposition of higher regulatory standards under national law. It
should not be open to the investor to use such standards as an argument for
avoiding the overriding duty to obey national law and to abide by the standards
that it sets.
II. JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL DECISIONS
The role of investor conduct in the development of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard will now be examined with a more detailed discussion of the
relevant cases. This follows the substantive classification listed in the intro-
duction, based on emergent duties to refrain from unconscionable conduct, to
invest with adequate knowledge of risk and to conduct business in a reason-
able manner.
A. The Duty to Refrain from Unconscionable Conduct
As noted in section I, commercial law recognizes that certain kinds of conduct
have no place in good commercial practice. Accordingly, fraud, misrepresen-
tation, undue influence or abuse of power on the part of an investor may all
form the basis of a legitimate interference with their rights to conduct the
investment. In such cases even the outright termination of the investment may
be justified, provided it is a proportionate response to the impugned action.
The leading case in this regard is Azanian v Mexico.31 The claimants were US
citizens who had formed a Mexican entity, DESONA, which held a conces-
sion contract to undertake waste collection and disposal in the city of
Naucalpan de Juarez. The investors had obtained the concession on the basis
of a business plan that asserted, among other matters, the extensive compe-
tence of the claimants in the waste management business working through a
US company named Global Waste, and which made extensive claims as to
amounts of capital that would be invested and the number of jobs created.32 In
fact, only one of the investors had any experience at all in this field, and
Global Waste had been in existence for only 14 months in Los Angeles,
despite assertions that it had over 40 years of experience in the business.33 In
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addition, the business plan relied on commitments from third parties that were
not to materialize. Indeed, the claimants had no resources of their own that
could be used to put the plan into operation,34 and they had failed to disclose
to the relevant authorities that a major third party had withdrawn from the
project. The Tribunal held that this non-disclosure was unconscionable.35
More generally, the Tribunal said that the local authority charged with regu-
lating the concession contract was entitled to expect more from the investors
than that they would get third parties to carry out bits and pieces of this valu-
able contract once it had been signed.36 Therefore, the termination of the
concession was justifiable in the circumstances, a conclusion that had been
upheld by three levels of Mexican administrative and judicial bodies. This
case shows that misrepresentations, made by the investor as to the prospects
and manner of operation of an investment, can justify a termination of the
investment contract where the applicable national law allows for such a termi-
nation on the ground that the misrepresentation renders the contract invalid.
On the facts the Mexican authorities had acted lawfully and so no claim could
arise under NAFTA.
The issue of investor competence was also raised in the earlier case of SPP
v Egypt.37 In response to a claim arising out of the seizure of two hotels in
Egypt by the state-owned Egyptian partners in a joint venture established with
the claimant to develop the hotels, the Egyptian Government sought to argue
that the claimant, Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), was not competent to
undertake the investment. This was based on SPPs alleged misrepresentation
as to its financial capacity and tourism expertise when the project was
proposed to the Egyptian Government.38 The claimant responded by saying
that its long expertise in the tourism industry had been thoroughly investigated
by the Egyptian authorities and that none of the allegations made by the
Government as to SPPs solvency or competence had been made out.39 The
Tribunal rejected the Egyptian claims. On the evidence, it was clear that SPP
had the required funds for the project and that any difficulties in financing the
hotels were due to the failure of the Egyptian authorities to provide the joint
venture with promised infrastructure support and customs clearance for certain
materials and equipment imported for the project.40 It was also evident that
SPP had substantial experience and expertise in the tourism business before
becoming involved in the project. The Egyptian authorities had confirmed
SPPs experience before entering into the investment agreement after exten-
sive investigations.41
This decision suggests that the host country may have an obligation to
ensure the truth of any material representations made by the investor as to their
competence, financial resources and any other relevant matters pertaining to
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the investment. What is unclear is how far such a duty might go. In particular,
it may be one thing for the Egyptian Government, as an active party to the
project, to use its resources to undertake an extensive investigation; it may be
quite another matter for a cash-strapped Mexican local authority to do so.
Resources must surely be an issue here, especially in relation to developing
host countries that may simply be unable to undertake the relevant inquiries.
Equally, to shift too great a burden upon the host country may be to absolve
the investor from a fundamental obligation of honesty and candour that lies at
the heart of good business practice and, furthermore, to absolve the investor
from a duty not to misrepresent facts, given the important public interest issues
that can be connected with a major investment project. This raises the ques-
tion whether investment agreements are purely commercial transactions,
where the rule of caveat emptor applies and, with it, a negative rule not to
make misrepresentations, or whether their public interest aspects require a
positive duty of disclosure on the part of investors. Azanian might suggest the
latter, though SPP v Egypt gives some force to the former view. It remains to
be seen how this issue will develop.
SPP v Egypt raises a further key issue in the area of unconscionable
conduct. In the course of the proceedings Egypt raised the argument that the
seizure of the hotels was justified by the irregular contacts and connections
that the claimants were alleged to have had with various government officials
at the time the investment agreement was concluded.42 This allegation was
dismissed by the Tribunal on the basis that it was not substantiated by the
evidence:
Nowhere, however, is there any specific allegation of unlawful conduct on the
part of the Claimants which could conceivably vitiate the relevant agreements or
excuse non-performance of the Respondents obligations under those agree-
ments.43
The language of the Tribunal is instructive. It is clear that, if there were suffi-
cient evidence of improper contacts (and the implication of improper influence
that would flow from this), the investment agreement would be vitiated and
the Respondent could terminate further performance. It may be surmised that
if, in a future case, such conduct were to be proved, and the host country termi-
nated the investment, the actions of the host country could not be impugned as
unfair or inequitable.
More recently, the issue of improper contact with officials was considered
in the case of Olguin v Paraguay.44 In that case, the claimant argued that funds
slated for his investment in a snack food company had been expropriated by
the alleged failure of the Paraguayan authorities to regulate effectively the
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activities of a bank, La Mercantil, in which he had made substantial deposits
that were to be used to finance the project. The bank failed as a result of the
wider economic crisis in Paraguay in 1995 and the claimant lost a substantial
part of his deposits. In the course of the hearing it was established that the
claimant had been persuaded to invest in the project, and to deposit the
required capital with La Mercantil, by an official of the Central Bank of
Paraguay, Juan Luis Osselli Pagaliaro. That official, and the general manager
of La Mercantil, Tomas Rovira, arranged the execution of the snack food
companys articles of association and were named, alongside the claimant, as
members of the board. It appears they had diverted bank funds through that
company.45 The claimant subsequently complained that the government
authorities had failed to control these actions, which raised issues of conflict
of interest on the part of the public and private bank officials involved. The
Tribunal was unimpressed saying that, [p]erhaps it would be overly zealous
to attempt to demand that the Paraguayan financial control bodies be obligated
to detect and prevent hidden or shadow relationships of public officers (in
the case of Oselli) or private ones (in the case of Rovira), that place them in a
clear situation of legally culpable conflict of interest, as indicated by the audi-
tors of La Mercantil.46 While there is no clear finding of corrupt practices on
the part of the investor and the officials acting togetherit appears rather that
the investor was cheatedthe suggestion of impropriety may have made the
Tribunal unsympathetic to the claim, even though it felt that the Paraguayan
authorities had acted negligently in regard to their duties to monitor, supervise
and control the agents of their countrys financial market.47
Thus the conduct of the investor may be weighed against the conduct of the
host country authorities in determining whether the latter had indeed acted
wrongly. However that conduct must reach a threshold level of uncon-
scionability to negate the improper conduct of the host authorities. For exam-
ple, in Feldman v Mexico48 the investor claimed to have been discriminated
against by the Mexican tax authorities because they had allowed a direct
competitor to take advantage of certain tax concessions that had not been
extended to him. It appeared that these concessions were being granted contrary
to the requirements of Mexican tax law, in that the claimants for the conces-
sions did not provide full invoices for the transactions concerned as required by
law.49 Nonetheless the Tribunal found for the investor on the discrimination
claim, though an accompanying claim for expropriation was rejected. In this
case the authorities themselves had turned a blind eye to the requirements of the
law and the investor sought to take advantage of this, as did his competitors.
Whether this decision is appropriate may be open to question. Investment
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Tribunals should not countenance illegal behaviour by investors or govern-
mental officials. On the other hand, it may be that the Tribunal felt that the
improprieties on either side balanced each other out and so a claim for discrim-
ination could be made out in violation of NAFTA Article 1102. It may also be
suggested that it is not the role of an international tribunal to reverse an illegal
national policy, but to adjudicate the issues arising out of the applicable IIA.
Only the question whether the illegality violates the IIA is in issue. However,
one may be left to muse whether NAFTA was really intended to allow
investors protection against the denial of illegal tax concessions.50 On the
other hand, making the host country pay compensation for not extending ille-
gal tax concessions to foreign investors, contrary to the national treatment
rule, can be interpreted as an incentive for the host country not to allow such
illegality to prevail in the first place.
The duty not to act in an unconscionable manner may be said to entail an
obligation to behave with candour and transparency in dealings with host
county authorities. In Genin v Estonia51 the Tribunal noted that there existed
a duty on the part of the investor to cooperate prudentially with financial regu-
lators by providing information. On the facts the American investor had failed
to do so. In particular, the investor did not offer clear information on the ulti-
mate shareholders of the foreign parent companies, that he in fact owned and
controlled, and that had invested in a local bank, EIB. This lack of clarity led
the Bank of Estonia to revoke the operating licence of EIB, leading to the
investors claim that he had been subjected to unfair and inequitable treatment
contrary to the bilateral investment agreement (BIT) between the United
States and Estonia. While the Tribunal found that, in a number of respects, the
Bank of Estonias banking supervision department had acted in a manner that
fell below generally accepted banking and regulatory practices, the failure to
divulge the beneficial ownership of the parent company to the authorities was
a cause of legitimate concern and was one of the very reasons for the suspi-
cions of the authorities regarding the operations of EIB.52 The Tribunal held
that the Bank of Estonia had acted within its statutory discretion and that its
ultimate decision could not be said to have been arbitrary or discriminatory
against foreign investors in the sense in which those words were used in the
BIT. In coming to its conclusion the Tribunal stressed that it was:
imperative to recall the particular context in which the dispute arose, namely, that
of a renascent independent state, coming rapidly to grips with the reality of
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modern financial, commercial and banking practices and the emergence of state
institutions responsible for overseeing and regulating areas of activity perhaps
previously unknown. This is the context in which Claimants knowingly chose to
invest in an Estonian financial institution, EIB.53
The suggestion is that investors must take into account the degree of sophisti-
cation of the local authorities when doing business in a particular host coun-
try. Where that country is like Estonia, in a process of change and transition,
this may require a higher degree of candour and transparency than might be
expected when dealing with a more developed market economy State.
Equally, this may have led the Tribunal into balancing the procedural failures
of the Estonian regulators (not giving the investor advance notice of the
proposed revocation, or a chance to make representations to the authorities,
and making the revocation immediately effective) against the apparent lack of
openness and cooperation on the part of the investor. This case raises many
interesting issues concerning the relationship between host country character-
istics and the resulting responsibilities of good corporate citizens. It might lead
to the view that not only a transitional economy, but also a developing coun-
try economy, may require some special consideration on the part of the
investor as to how they should work with the local authorities. This issue is
closely related to the duty to enter into an investment with full knowledge of
risk, which is discussed below.
Finally, the principle of unconscionability may require that the investor
does not abuse a superior bargaining position with the host country to extract
unduly beneficial promises and other advantages for the investment from it.54
There is very little authority on this question. Indeed, the only hint that such
an analysis might be undertaken, by an international tribunal, comes from the
ELSI Case.55 In that case, a Sicilian electronics company, ELSI, was wholly-
owned and controlled by two US corporations, Raytheon, which owned 99.16
per cent of the shares and Machlett, a wholly owned subsidiary of Raytheon,
which owned the remaining 0.84 per cent. ELSI had ceased to be a profitable
investment. Between 1964 and 1966 it had made an insufficient operating
profit to cover its debts and accumulated losses. This required the company to
reduce its equity under Italian law. That was done in 1966 and again in 1967.
The US parent companies blamed this situation in part on over-manning and
decided to embark upon a series of redundancies. Given ELSIs significance
as a major employer in an otherwise economically underdeveloped region,
these job losses caused considerable unrest and, eventually, led to strikes and
an occupation of the plant in 1968. At the same time, the US parents planned
an orderly liquidation of the company under Italian law, while also trying to
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save the plant by way of negotiations with local and national authorities in
Italy. The US parents had hoped that an Italian public sector partner could
enter into ownership of the company and that regional aid could be obtained.
According to the majority of the ICJ, this dual track policy had a Janus-like
character as the management of ELSI hoped that, the threat of closure and
dismissal of the workforce might bring such pressures to bear on the Italian
authorities to persuade them to provide what Raytheon had long hoped for: an
influential Italian partner, new capital and Mezzogiorno benefits.56 While not
amounting to a finding of actual coercion on the part of the investors, the
attention paid by the ICJ to the context of negotiations suggests that, in appro-
priate cases, the conduct of the investor during negotiations with the host
country could be taken into account when determining whether their claim
against the host country is valid. Although the investment in ELSI was unprof-
itable, it can be said that the US parents still had a stronger bargaining posi-
tion in that they could afford to walk away from the investment, while the
Italian authorities were faced with a major regional economic and social cata-
strophe that they had to remedy.57
B. A Duty to Invest with Adequate Knowledge of Risk
The recent case-law on the scope of protection offered by IIAs appears to be
developing a principle that the investor is bound to assess the extent of the
investment risk before entering the investment, to have realistic expectations
as to its profitability and to be on notice of both the prospects and pitfalls of
an investment undertaken in a high risk-high return location. Any losses that
subsequently arise out of an inaccurate risk assessment will be borne by the
investor. They will not be recoverable under the terms of the investment
treaty. Such a duty would appear to be entirely consonant with an analysis of
the fair and equitable treatment standard, given the inherent balancing process
that lies at its heart. This is also a principle that is consistent with good busi-
ness practice, as it requires the investor to take responsibility for the normal
commercial risk associated with the investment rather than to find a source of
insurance in the host countrys obligations under the applicable investment
agreement. The development of such a principle is justified by the view that
IIAs, are not insurance policies against bad business judgments.58 It is
further consistent with the concept of corporate social responsibility, as it will
encourage prudent investment in the local communitya type of investment
that is likely to be more permanent and beneficial. On the other hand, as will
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be discussed below, a potential source of uncertainty in the emerging principle
lies with the role that host country characteristics might play in this assessment.
Central to the duty under discussion, is a proper assessment of investment
risk at the outset of the investment process. Accordingly, where the investor
fails to undertake a proper feasibility study they will have to bear the loss that
can be attributed to that failure, rather than to any host country action that is
contrary to the IIA. For example in Waste Management v Mexico the claimant
argued that its waste disposal concession for Acapulco had been wrongfully
expropriated on the ground that the municipal and regional authorities, with
whom the concession had been concluded, failed to meet their financial oblig-
ations towards the claimant under the concession, causing the investment to
fail. In fact the investment was not a good business proposition from the
outset. The claimant had great difficulties in attracting customers to its
services, the total number of whom fell well below expectations, and it had
employed considerably more personnel for street sweeping and refuse collec-
tion services than the minimum that had been required under the concession.
The Tribunal held that, [I]t is clear that the arrangement was not commer-
cially viable, taking into account both the lower than expected proportion of
customers serviced and the additional costs incurred.59 In the event the
Tribunal found no evidence of unfair or inequitable conduct. The non-payment
of debts due under the concession by the municipal authorities could be
explained by the financial crisis that had hit Mexico at the time, it was not
motivated by sectoral or local prejudice, and, in any case, the investor had
recourse to local legal remedies to rectify this matter.60 Nor did the Tribunal
uphold the claim that the non-payment was tantamount to an expropriation. In
coming to its conclusion the Tribunal made the following general statement:
In the Tribunals view it is not the function of the international law of expropri-
ation as reflected in Article 1110 to eliminate the normal commercial risks of the
foreign investor, or to place on Mexico the burden of compensating for the fail-
ure of a business plan which was, in the circumstances, founded on too narrow a
client base and dependent for its success on unsustainable assumptions about
customer uptake and contractual performance. A failing enterprise is not expro-
priated just because debts are not paid or other contractual obligations are not
fulfilled.61
Though made in the context of expropriation, there appears little reason to
exclude such considerations from the availability of redress under the fair and
equitable treatment standard.
The applicability of such reasoning to fair and equitable treatment claims is
confirmed in the case of MTD Equity v Chile.62 In that case, the Malaysian
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claimant, a property development company skilled in urban development,
successfully argued that the standard had been breached by Chile when the
Foreign Investment Commission wrongly authorized a major property devel-
opment investment by the claimant that was incompatible with established
planning regulations. The host country authorities thus breached the fair and
equitable treatment standard by granting an investment authorization that was
unlawful.63 The claimant had been advised, by the owner of the land in ques-
tion, that an exception to the planning regulations could be obtained. This was
wrong. Instead, the planning authorities prohibited the investment from going
ahead.64 Chile argued that the claimant had failed to exercise the due diligence
that a normal investor could be expected to follow when making a study of the
feasibility of an investment. The host country could not be responsible for the
losses that flowed from the unwise business decisions of the claimant in
following bad advice and in not protecting itself against losses due to difficul-
ties in obtaining necessary planning authorizations.65 The Tribunal agreed.
The claimants had relied on the landowners representation that the land in
question could be rezoned, and had paid the full price up-front even though the
project did not have appropriate legal protection. They should also bear the
risk of loss arising from their partnership with the landowner, who was in
financial difficulties.66 Accordingly, the Tribunal reduced the amount of
compensation for breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard by 50 per
cent, representing the amount of loss that was attributable to the claimants
own conduct rather than to the unlawful authorization decision. In a similar
vein, the Tribunal in the Genin case refused to accept a claim for breach of fair
and equitable treatment arising out of the purchase, by EIB, of a bank branch,
owned by another Estonian bank, that was in financial difficulties. The
Tribunal held that there was no proof of misrepresentations being made to the
claimant by officials of the Bank of Estonia about the situation of the branch.
To the contrary, the officers of EIB who conducted the negotiations regarding
the purchase of the branch had acted unprofessionally and carelessly. They
had failed to make a proper assessment of the credit portfolio of the branch,
and they should have been particularly careful knowing that the parent bank
of the branch was on the verge of bankruptcy. Thus the responsibility for the
resulting loss was EIBs alone.67
Related to the question of assessing the commercial feasibility of an invest-
ment is the overall investment climate in the host country. It would appear that
the investor must also take this into account when assessing the viability and
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profitability of the proposed investment. This was made clear in the Olguin
case where the Tribunal stressed that the claimant could not complain of the
admittedly serious shortcomings of the Paraguayan legal system and of vari-
ous state agencies:
What is evident is that Mr Olguin, an accomplished businessman, with a track
record as an entrepreneur going back many years and experience acquired in the
business world in various countries, was not unaware of the situation in
Paraguay. He had his reasons (which this Tribunal makes no attempt to judge)
for investing in this country, but it is not reasonable for him to seek compensa-
tion for the losses he suffered on making a speculative, or at best, not very
prudent, investment.68
Similar caution has also been required of investors in transitional economies
in Central and Eastern Europe. As noted in the discussion of the Genin Case
above, where the investor knows these local circumstances that may affect the
outcome of their claim.69 More recently, the investment climate in the Ukraine
was considered to be relevant in the assessment of the claims arising in the
case of Generation Ukraine v Ukraine.70 There, the Tribunal maintained that
the vicissitudes of the host State economy were relevant in determining the
investors legitimate expectations when applying the minimum standards of
treatment contained in BITs. It noted:
The Claimant was attracted to the Ukraine because of the possibility of earning
a rate of return on its capital in significant excess to other investment opportuni-
ties in more developed countries. The Claimant thus invested in the Ukraine on
notice of both prospects and potential pitfalls. The investment was speculative
. . . the Claimant had undoubtedly experienced frustration and delay caused by
bureaucratic incompetence and recalcitrance in various forms. But equally, the
Claimant had managed to secure a 49-year leasehold over prime commercial
property in the centre of Kyiv without having participated in a competitive tender
and without having made any substantial payment to the Ukrainian authorities.71
In addition, where the host country is facing serious economic crisis, a
tribunal will take note of this fact. Thus, in the Olguin Case, the Tribunal said
that prudence would have prompted a foreigner arriving in a country that had
suffered severe economic problems to be much more conservative in his
investments72 Equally, the Tribunal, in the recent case of CMS v Argentina,
held that account should be taken of the effect of abnormal conditions,
prompted by the economic crisis in Argentina, in assessing the scope of
protection afforded to the investor by an investment treaty.73 It continued:
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The crisis had in itself a severe impact upon the Claimants business, but this
aspect must to some extent be attributed to the business risk the Claimant took
on when investing in Argentina, this being particularly the case as it related to
decrease in demand. Such effects cannot be ignored as if business had continued
as usual. Otherwise both parties would not be sharing some of the costs of the
crisis in a reasonable manner and the decision could eventually amount to an
insurance policy against business risk, and outcome that, as the Respondent has
rightly argued, would not be justified.74
While such concerns may be relevant in special cases, such as transitional
economies, economies in crisis, and, possibly, highly underdeveloped coun-
tries or failing States, it is unclear how far the investment climate needs to be
taken into account in host countries that are not facing such extreme condi-
tions.75 In addition, the investment climate cannot be used as an excuse for
bad governance where the host country is able to offer high standards of
administrative action but fails to do so. It remains to be seen how tribunals will
develop this aspect of the duty to make a diligent assessment of the proposed
investment and, in particular, whether, in the case of transitional economies,
tribunals will demand higher standards of administrative and legal probity as
these countries become more experienced in the ways of market regulation. It
may be rather too easy for a host country to use this argument in justifying its
own regulatory shortcomings. Thus some limits need to be developed to this
argument. So far the existing case law remains relatively unclear.76
The duty to assess the risk of the investment may be seen as an application
of the equitable concept of benefit and burden. This may obtain some support
from the approach of the ICJ to this issue in the Barcelona Traction Case.77
In relation to the question whether the State of the shareholder in a company
should have a right of diplomatic protection on their behalf, independent of
any right of the State of nationality of the company to bring a claim on behalf
of the company, the Court said:
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It should also be observed that the promoters of a company whose operations will
be international must take into account the fact that States have, with regard to
their nationals, a discretionary power to grant diplomatic protection or refuse it.
When establishing a company in a foreign country its promoters are normally
impelled by particular considerations; it is often a question of tax or other advan-
tages offered by the host State. It does not seem to be in any way inequitable that
the advantage thus obtained should be balanced by the risks arising from the fact
that the protection of the company and hence of its shareholders is thus entrusted
to a State other than the national State of the shareholder.78
This passage is interesting because it considers the voluntary assumption of
risk by the company or its shareholders, concerning the availability, or other-
wise, of diplomatic protection, as capable of being balanced against the bene-
fits of investing in the host country. This implies that the voluntary assumption
of risk by the investor may be a relevant factor in determining whether State
conduct is equitable or inequitable to the investor. Although the ICJ is assess-
ing what is equitable in a particular context, this is but one instance of a wider
approach to determining equitable or inequitable conduct, which requires an
assessment of State actions in the light of the benefits and burdens that may
underlie the undertaking of an investment.79 It would appear that the cases
reviewed in this part of the paper offer further examples of how this concept
might be applied.
C. A Duty to Conduct Business in a Reasonable Manner
A third emergent principle based on investor conduct may be said to rest upon
a duty to conduct the investment, once it has been undertaken, in a reasonable
manner. Where it can be shown that the loss incurred by the investor has been
caused by their bad management of the investment, rather than by any regula-
tory action on the part of the host country, a claim for breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard would not lie for that element of loss which could
be attributed to the conduct of the investor. This is no more than an extrapo-
lation of the reasoning in MTD Equity v Chile, discussed in the previous
section, beyond the initial risk assessment to the subsequent management of
the investment after entry. It would be strange if such an extension of the
causation principle could not occur just because the investment was already
established as opposed to being badly assessed at the pre-entry stage.
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The key issue in this connection concerns the content of the duty. To date
the case-law is still far from complete. However certain expectations as to the
conduct of the investor appear to be crystallizing. Specifically, the investor
must manage the investment in a manner that will ensure the economic viabil-
ity of the investment, they must be aware of the regulatory environment in
which they operate, ensure compliance with any applicable regulatory require-
ments and take relevant professional advice. In addition, should a dispute arise
with the local administrative authorities, the investor is bound to take advan-
tage of any available local remedies that are capable of correcting the alleged
administrative wrong.
As to the obligation to ensure the economic viability of the investment, this
may be said to lie not only with the general company law duty to manage an
investment in the best interests of its shareholders, but with a corporate
responsibility to act in the best interests of the host country and its economic
development. A well-run investment will be able to provide employment,
skills and technology transfer and revenue, in accordance with the business
plan that forms the basis of the decision to invest. This does not mean that the
investor must anticipate every vicissitude that may damage the investment,
and be held responsible for the resulting effects. It means that the investor
must take reasonable care in the conduct of the investment so that it can real-
ize, so far as is reasonably possible, the anticipated benefits to all the stake-
holders with an interest in its success. This approach is illustrated by the
decision of the ICJ in the ELSI Case, the facts of which have already been
outlined above.80
On the facts, the United States alleged inter alia a breach of the US-Italy
FCN Treaty on the ground that the response of the Mayor of Palermo to the
impending closure of the plant, by requisitioning it, amounted to a violation of
Article III(2), in that this deprived Raytheon and Machlett of the right to
control and manage their investment as protected under that provision. The
ICJ held that this claim had not been made out because, by the time the plant
had been requisitioned, the parent companies had become unable to control, or
to manage, the investment in a way that could lead to an orderly liquidation
under Italian law.81 In particular, no causal link had been established between
the requisition and the effects on ELSI attributed to it by the United States.
There were numerous causes acting together leading to what the ICJ termed
the disaster at ELSI. However, the underlying cause was held to be ELSIs
headlong course towards insolvency; which state of affairs it seems to have
attained even prior to the requisition.82 The Court continued:
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the acts of the Italian authorities.
82 (n 6) para 101.
There was the warning loudly proclaimed about its precarious position; there was
the socially damaging decision to terminate the business, close the plant and
dismiss the workforce; there was the position of the banks as major creditors. In
short the possibility of the solution of orderly liquidation, which Raytheon and
Machlett claim to have been deprived of as a result of the requisition, is purely a
matter of speculation.83
This is a clear indication that the ICJ was strongly influenced by the evidence
of management conduct when coming to its conclusion. In particular, the
Court emphasizes the socially damaging effects of the closure, apparently
suggesting that wider stakeholder interests may be relevant in determining
how management is conducted. Such an approach would be consistent with
recent guidelines on corporate responsibility.84 This, coupled with the Courts
highlighting of the arm-twisting of the Italian authorities to assist in the
continued operation of a plant that was never economically self-sufficient and
never paid any dividends,85 suggests that the real problem with ELSI was not
only that the parent companies failed to manage the plant profitably, but that
they also contributed to its ultimate downfall and to the major social conse-
quences that this entailed. Paradoxically, it could be said that this implies a
continuing ability of the parents to manage ELSI, but to do so only very badly,
so badly, in fact, that they could be held no longer to control or manage the
enterprise!86
The approach taken by the ICJ in the ELSI Case has been endorsed by a
recent ICSID Tribunal in Noble Ventures Inc v Romania.87 On facts reminis-
cent of the ELSI Case, the Tribunal held that the claimant could not make out
a claim that Romania had breached the fair and equitable treatment standard,
or the expropriation provision, under the US-Romania BIT. The claimant had
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84 For example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises would support such an
approach by reference to Guideline II General Policies which includes in para 4 an obligation to
[e]ncourage human capital formation, in particular by creating employment opportunities and
facilitating training opportunities for employees. However, the Guidelines, as interpreted, do not
prevent the closure of unprofitable facilities provided that such closure is undertaken in accor-
dance with local laws and practices, that reasonable notice is given to the employees and govern-
ment authorities and that firms cooperate to the greatest possible extent in the mitigation of any
adverse social effects: see Muchlinski (n 11) 4645.
85 See text at nn 567. See too the discussion of the case in Andreas F Lowenfeld International
Economic Law (paperback edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2003) 4358.
86 The analysis of the ICJ has been criticized on this point: according to Murphy (n 55) 428,
the right to control and manage entails an ability to choose a particular course of action, whatever
its prospects of success or failure. By coming to its decision, the majority of the ICJ placed too
much emphasis on the likelihood of a successful outcome to the liquidation and too little on the
freedom of management to choose a particular course of action. According to F A Mann, the right
to control and manage subsisted until the requisition: F A Mann Foreign Investment in the
International Court of Justice: The ELSI Case  (1992) 86 AJIL 92, 967. Ultimately, the case may
be said to have turned on the failure by the US to establish a key factthat the companys posi-
tion was still sufficiently secure to allow its owners to continue to exercise important rights of
management and control before the requisition: Murphy, ibid 450.
87 (n 67).
invested in the privatization of a major iron and steel works (CSR) located in
the Resita region, which employed some 4000 workers. The claimant alleged,
inter alia, that the respondent country had undermined the economic viability
of the investment, through the failure of the relevant privatization authorities
to secure the restructuring of CSRs debts, and by reason of its subsequent
legal proceedings to effect a judicial reorganization of the company. The
Tribunal rejected these claims by reference to the investors conduct. It held
that Noble Ventures was as much to blame for this situation as the state priva-
tization authority. If the claimant had believed that the restructuring was a
mere formality then the claimants assumption was fundamentally flawed. 88
On the evidence, it was clear that without the restructuring, the collapse of
CSR was all too readily foreseeable.89 In addition, the claimant refused to
invest any of its own funds in the restructuring process, and had defaulted on
repayments on a loan facility provided by a consortium of Spanish banks,
which could have provided finance for the restructuring. As a result, the
claimant had failed to fulfil its promises to pay the workforce, whose wages
were in serious arrears. In the circumstances, as in the ELSI Case, the judicial
reorganization of the works could be seen as the only short-term solution to
the social crisis that had engulfed Resita as a result of the claimants inabil-
ity to pay the workforce.90 Given that, in addition, the judicial reorganisation
of CSR had been carried out without arbitrariness or discrimination, and had
not been aimed at rescinding the Privatization Agreement between the parties,
it was neither a breach of the fair and equitable standard, nor was it an expro-
priation of the claimants investment.
A second feature of a duty to manage well lies in the need for management
to be fully aware of the regulatory environment in which they operate, and to
foresee any regulatory change that is likely as a result of the manner in which
that regulatory environment operates. This may be seen as a limit upon the
generally recognized obligation of host country authorities to act transparently
and to honour any assurances made to investors that existing regulations shall
not change.91 This limitation was made explicit in the recent Methanex
award.92 There the claimant, a Canadian producer of methanol, challenged
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37480. See also Occidental Exploration and Production Co v Ecuador award of 1 July 2004,
London Court of International Arbitration Administered Case No UN3467 available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf>. See for critical comment
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for breach of fair and equitable treatment for lack of transparency and clarity in the applicable
regulatory framework which was also changed during the life of the investment.
92 (n 75). See also International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico (n 10) where the
majority of the Tribunal held that the US Claimant had no reasonable basis upon which to rely on
an official administrative opinion (Oficio) to its detriment (see para 196) That opinion had been
furnished in response to the Claimants request to ascertain whether certain types of gaming
machines, that it proposed to place in a new outlet in Mexico, complied with the legal definition
of a game of skill, which was permissible under the law, rather than a game of chance which
Californian legislation, that banned the production of petrol containing
methanol-based additives, on the ground that this destroyed its market and
discriminated in favour of the US domestic ethanol industry, which could
comply with the new regulations. This was said to contravene Article 1110 of
NAFTA as it was a measure tantamount to expropriation and it failed to
comply with due process of law as required under the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard contained in Article 1105 of NAFTA. The Tribunal rejected the
claim. It laid particular importance to the fact that Methanex had not been
given any representations by the United States that it could reasonably have
relied upon to conclude that such regulatory changes would not occur. To the
contrary, Methanex had entered into a political economy, in which it was
widely known, if not notorious, that governmental environmental and health
protection institutions at the federal and state level . . . continuously monitored
the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or
restricted the use of some of those compounds for environmental and/or health
reasons.93 Methanex entered the market fully aware of this process and in the
absence of any specific commitments respecting restraints on future regulatory
actions made to induce the investment. Having rejected Methanexs allegation
that the ban was introduced as a result of improper political pressure, and
favouritism for US rivals, on the part of the then Governor of California, the
Tribunal concluded that no expropriation had taken place.
In the light of this case, it can be said that an investor enters into a host
country market undertaking the risk of foreseeable future regulatory change
unless they are given a stabilization commitment. Dishonouring such a
commitment on the part of the host country will amount to a breach of the fair
and equitable treatment standard. On the other hand, ordinary regulatory
change undertaken without a stabilization commitment, even if it is adverse to
the investors interests, cannot amount to a breach of the standard by and of
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was prohibited. The Claimant undertook the investment but it was closed by the gaming author-
ity acting under the revised policy of the new Mexican administration, which, unlike its prede-
cessor, was pledged to reverse the liberalization of gaming. In his Separate Opinion, Professor
Thomas Waelde disagreed and held that the Mexican authorities had breached the fair and equi-
table treatment standard in NAFTA. In his view, the Oficio was ambiguously worded, but it led
the Claimant to rely upon it and to believe that its machines could be lawfully operated. The
Claimant was a small business which did not have the same capacity for independent analysis of
the regulatory environment as would a large foreign investor, and that, in all the circumstances,
its legitimate expectation, created by the Oficio, that its investment would not be challenged, was
violated. This could not be excused by a change of governmental policy pursuant upon a change
of administration. In addition Professor Waelde felt that the Mexican authorities had a duty to
ascertain the facts independently of the Claimant, whose approach to them was in the manner of
advocacy for permission to operate the outlet in question. Accordingly the authorities had failed
to comply with principles of good governance by not doing so and by rendering the Oficio on the
basis of the facts supplied by the Claimant. For a critique of Professor Waeldes reasoning see Joy
Ejegi Re: Thunderbird and Legitimate Expectations Transnational Dispute Management
OGEMID Archive posted 1 Feb 2006 available at <www.transnational-dispute-management.com/
members/ogemid/2006/01/msg00> (accessed 8 Mar 2006).
93 ibid Part IV, Chapter D, p 5, para 10.
itself. Some further element of misconduct would need to be present that could
render the regulatory changes unfair or inequitable. Methanex attempted to
prove such additional circumstances by alleging that the executive arm of the
Government of California had acted improperly. Such actions might be seen
as a breach of the standard, but usually they will be very hard to prove.
A third element of the duty of reasonable management is the requirement
to follow any applicable regulatory requirements. Indeed, the formulations
used in certain BITs suggest that a failure to comply with the laws and regu-
lations of the host country may result in the exclusion of the investment from
the protection of the agreement. Thus, for example, the Malaysian Model BIT
defines protected investments as all investments that are made in accordance
with the laws, regulations and national policies of the Contracting Parties.94
This formulation places an obligation on the investor to comply with such
laws. For example, in the Maffezini Case, the Tribunal held that the claimant
was under a legal duty to carry out an environmental impact assessment in
order to comply with Spanish and European environmental laws applicable to
the establishment of a chemical works in Spain. His deliberate failure to do so
could not incur responsibility on the part of the Spanish State under the rele-
vant investment protection treaty, when the latter halted the project for failure
to comply with these environmental regulations. In particular the Tribunal
noted, the Kingdom of Spains action is fully consistent with Article 2(1) of
the Argentine-Spain Bilateral Investment Treaty, which calls for the promo-
tion of investment in compliance with national legislation. 95 It also noted that
ignorance of the law is no excuse, although the claimant was fully aware of the
legal requirements in this case.96 The approach taken in this case could easily
apply to other instances where the investor must comply with regulatory
requirements to ensure the legality of their investment. Arguably, the duty will
exist even if the applicable IIA is silent on the question of compliance with
local laws and regulations. This may be so if the duty is seen as implicit in any
claim for breach of fair and equitable treatment being an application of the
equitable principle that the person who seeks equity must do equity. Prior
compliance with the law is surely the epitome of this principle. On the other
hand, host countries should not rely on this duty where they make significant,
unforeseeable and unannounced changes in the law with the aim of trapping
an investor into giving up their investment as a result of non-compliance. That
would not be consistent with the accepted spirit of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard.
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Related to the obligation of following applicable regulatory requirements is
an obligation to take relevant professional advice. This will ensure proper
compliance with the law, and would be a reasonable precaution to take partic-
ularly where the investor is operating in an unfamiliar foreign business and
legal environment. This requirement was expressly referred to in the Feldman
Case. There the Tribunal noted that the investor, as a taxpayer, had to conform
to the requirements of tax law.97 A reasonable investor would take tax advice
so as to obtain a clarification of any applicable fiscal measures.98 This was an
active duty, requiring positive steps on the part of the investor.99 The require-
ment to take independent advice may work to break the chain of causation
between governmental acts and the alleged loss suffered by the investor, much
as it would under domestic commercial law.100 For example, in the case of
ADF Group Inc v United States101 the Tribunal rejected a claim for breach of
the fair and equitable treatment standard in Article 1105 of NAFTA, which
was based on an alleged misapplication by the host country of a statute that
required local purchasing of inputs for government procurement contracts.
The Tribunal observed that the claimant sought to base the claim upon a read-
ing of the applicable case-law that appeared to have arisen from private legal
advice that was at odds with the governments own interpretation of the law.
In the absence of any misleading statement made by the government on this
matter the claim had to fail. This decision suggests, first, that the presence, or
absence, of a misrepresentation as to the true state of the law would be
required to show that the government authority has acted in breach of the fair
and equitable treatment standard and, second, that the investor is bound to
ascertain a correct interpretation of the law based upon independent legal
advice. Where that advice is inaccurate, in the absence of a misrepresentation
of law by the host government authorities, the investor is fixed with the effects
of the advice they have received. Any resulting loss is due to the bad advice
and not to governmental unfairness. However, this should not be read as
allowing governmental authorities to avoid expressing an opinion as to the
true meaning of applicable rules and regulations when asked, and instead
warning investors to seek independent advice. Such an approach might
conflict with emerging duties of transparency on the part of host governments,
and would not be in accordance with a positive spirit towards investment
promotion and protection.102
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where reliance on an independent assessment of the facts when entering into a contract would
negate the effect of any misrepresentation made to the representee: see Attwood v Small (1838) 6
Cl & Fin 232.
101 ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/1 award of 9 Jan 2003: 18 ICSID Rev-FILJ 195
102 See, for example, the transparency provisions in the US-Uruguay BIT 25 Oct 2004: (2005)
44 ILM 265  Arts 1011 which include a duty to notify and inform the investor as to legal devel-
opments (Art 11(3)). One issue in this regard might be the effect of any disclaimers as to the accu-
racy of legal information contained in governmental publications that do not purport to be legally
Finally, a duty of good management may require that legal disputes be
taken before effective national dispute settlement bodies. Thus, in the
Feldman Case, the Tribunal suggested that, as part of the process of clarifica-
tion of the applicable tax measures, the claimant should have availed himself
of local procedures.103 Similarly, in the Generation Ukraine Case the
Tribunal, citing the Feldman Case, stressed the need for the investor to make
a reasonable effort to obtain the legal correction of an administrative fault.
Failure to do so could not turn the alleged fault into a breach of the BIT. In the
absence of any per se violation of the BIT arising out of the conduct of the
local authorities, the only possible violation of the BIT would be a denial of
justice before the host country courts.104 Such awards raise the possibility that
the local remedies rule, a principle of international law that has been deliber-
ately omitted from most BITs and other types of IIA, is being introduced by
the back door.105 This view may be strengthened if the duty to take effective
legal measures for the review of local administrative and judicial action is
built into the substantive standards of protection in BITs and other IIAs. Thus
in the Waste Management Case, the Tribunal, while acknowledging that the
procedural requirement to exhaust local remedies had been dispensed with by
NAFTA Chapter 11, went on to say that, the availability of local remedies to
an investor faced with contractual breaches is nonetheless relevant to the ques-
tion whether a standard such as Article 1105(1) has been complied with by the
State.106 It went on to examine the legal proceedings that had taken place in
Mexico and concluded that there had not been a denial of justice in violation
of the fair and equitable treatment standard.107
This approach may create a number of problems.108 First, it is not clear
whether recourse to domestic remedies is a general prerequisite of the fair and
equitable treatment standard (or any other substantive standard, for that
matter) or an element in proving that the standard has been violated due to a
denial of due process before local tribunals. Secondly, to introduce such a
substantive requirement may weaken the aim of providing for delocalized
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106 (n 10) para 116.
107 See also, to similar effect, Azanian v Mexico (n 31).
108 See Schreuer (n 105) 1516 on which this discussion draws.
dispute settlement procedures under an IIA, as an inducement for investment
promotion under the agreement. The exclusion of local remedies may also
extend, in certain exceptional circumstances, to agreements that have an
exhaustion of local remedies requirement by virtue of the application of the
Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment clause.109 Such an application of the
MFN principle might not be possible if the substantive requirement gathers
pace in arbitral case-law. It would be nonsense to require the use of local
remedies as a substantive element of the fair and equitable treatment standard
while, at the same time, excluding it through the MFN principle. Thirdly, it is
unclear how a requirement to use local remedies would combine with a fork-
in-the-road provision, requiring the investor to choose between domestic
tribunals and international arbitration. According to Professor Schreuer, once
the investor has taken the dispute to the national courts that would rule out
subsequent access to the international forum.110 On the other hand, it would
appear that such a choice would not preclude the investor from bringing an
international claim for breach of fair and equitable treatment under an IIA, if
the national procedure fails to meet the minimum due process standard
demanded by that principle. In such a case, it is not the underlying investment
dispute that founds the international case but the very fact that the national
procedures, charged with its resolution, have failed to meet international treaty
standards.
On the other hand, the inclusion of the need to use local remedies can help
to strike a balance between the rights of the investor and the right of the host
country to regulate the investment, including through the provision of adequate
national remedies for investors.111 In addition, in settling disputes, it is wise to
use the procedure that is least likely to damage long-term goodwill between the
disputants, assuming that they wish to continue with their relationship. Thus, in
the case of investment disputes, an ascending order of dispute settlement tech-
niques may be called for beginning with negotiation and other alternative
dispute resolution methods, national arbitral and/or judicial dispute settlement
and, finally, international dispute settlement. Provided the host country can
offer reliable and effective dispute settlement systems it may be in the long-
term interests of both parties to have recourse to local courts and tribunals first.
The giving of precedence to international dispute settlement as a first option
may serve only to escalate disputes, increase legal costs, and to lessen the
chances of the investment relationship surviving, especially if the host country
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community perceives the delocalization of the dispute as being politically ille-
gitimate. By way of conclusion on this point, it may be said that recent case-
law developments suggest that investors should have a duty to use local
remedies as an aspect of good corporate citizenship and good management
practice, in return for the host country providing proper and effective means
of redress, with international dispute settlement remaining available, as an
option of last resort, to determine whether essential due process standards have
been observed at the national level.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has sought to outline some emergent principles concerning the role
of investor conduct in the development of the fair and equitable treatment
standard. Though based on what can be termed a first generation of judicial
decisions,112 the foregoing analysis shows that investor conduct is taken into
account in relation to the various claims made by investors, including fair and
equitable treatment claims. In so doing, investment tribunals are displaying an
ability to balance investor and host country interests. They will accept
defences against investor claims that arise out of the investors own failure to
assess risk and/or bad management, that are out of line with the legitimate
expectations of investors, or that are in some way unconscionable.
The proper way forward, for the development of the jurisprudence on
investor conduct, is to apply concepts of good faith and responsible business
practice that are already well understood in national laws and practices, as well
as in business custom. It is necessary for investment tribunals to give attention
to the underlying bargain between investor and host country and to ask
whether each side is keeping to it. In essence that is what fair and equitable
treatment is about: is the host country acting in accordance with the legitimate
expectations created for the investor at the time the investment was entered
into, thereby allowing the investor a reasonable opportunity to profit, and is
the investor delivering, to the best standard of care and due diligence, the
reasonably anticipated economic and other benefits of the investment? That
would appear to encapsulate the true aims and purposes of investment treaties
as they are currently drafted.
There are numerous technical issues arising out of the above discussion that
will need further clarification by future tribunals faced with defences based on
investor conduct. Among the many will be: how to strike a balance between
host country representations and those made by investors in determining
whether there has been active misrepresentation by either side; the precise role
of the host country in verifying investor representations; how notions of undue
pressure and undue influence on both sides should contribute to the evolution
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of the duty not to act unconscionably in negotiations over the investment; what
will be an acceptable assessment of risk by the investor and what role does the
host country play in this; what are the limits of host country characteristics in
determining the responsibility of the investor in carrying loss; are all investors
to be treated as equally able to protect their interests or are some weaker than
others and need more protection from the host country? However, the most
significant issue for the future will be to delimit more fully the role of the need
to use local remedies. If taken too far this may effectively neutralize the
protective power of IIAs. In particular, their capacity to insist that effective
dispute settlement methods are available, by way of the threat of internation-
alized dispute settlement, will be weakened. It would be strange if develop-
ments in the fair and equitable treatment standard were to lead to such a result.
On the other hand, the emergent duties of investors appear to be consistent
with sound commercial principles and the public policy concerns of host coun-
tries when dealing with investors. Caveat investor may well become a
common a phrase in international investment law as these issues evolve.113
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